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I. INTRODUCTION

2
The use of experts in trial practice is no longer the exception, but the norm.
The nation's largest referral service for experts, Technical Advisory Service for
Attorneys, Inc., lists 22,500 experts who are willing to testify on some 5,500
subjects, including ear print identification, UFO's and wigs. 3 Expert testimony
is big business, and clearly the experts are here to stay.
But when and on what can an expert testify? The Federal Rules of Evidence,
in attempting to resolve the confusion which existed at common law,4 set forth

the following basic premise: an expert can testify whenever it is helpful to the
trier of fact.5 The expert's testimony may be based upon his own perceptions,
the testimony of others, or the observations of certain others upon whom
experts usually rely,6 and where the expert renders an opinion, the testimony
2

Charles Bruce Rosenberg, a litigation management consultant, notes that

"[tlwenty-five years ago, it was the unusual nonproduct [liability] case that involved an
expert. Now, it's par for the course." Don J. DeBenedictis, Off-Target Opinions, ABA
JOURNAL, Nov., 1994, at 76.
3

1d.

4

See discusssion infra part H.

5

FED. R. EVID. 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
The advisory committee has stated that "[tihe basic approach to opinions.., is to admit
them when helpful to the trier of fact." FED. R. EviD. 704 advisory committee's note.
6

FED. R. EVID. 703:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to
the expert at or before the hearing....
As the advisory committee explained:
Facts or data upon which expert opinions are based may, under
the rule, be derived from three possible sources. The first is the firsthand observation of the witness, with opinions based thereon traditionally allowed. A treating physician affords an example.... The
second source, presentation at the trial, also reflects existing practice.
The technique may be the familiar hypothetical question or having
the expert attend the trial and hear the testimony establishing the
facts.... The third source contemplated by the rule consists of presentation of data to the expert outside of court and other than by his
own perception. In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the
basis for expert opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions
and to bring the judicial practice into line with the practice of the
experts themselves when not in court. Thus a physician in his own
practice bases his diagnosis on information from numerous sources
and of considerable variety, including statements by patients and
relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other
doctors, hospital records, and X rays. Most of them are admissible
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is not objectionable simply because it goes to the ultimate issue that the parties
7

seek to resolve.
Although these rules sound simple, the appellate briefs continue to stack up,
and courts throughout the country are drafting countless opinions on the
admissibility of expert opinion testimony in cases where the expert relates legal
principles to factual bases. 8 The decisions, for the most part, have only one
thing in common: they track the languageof the Federal Rules. Substantively,
however, the decisions are highly inconsistent.
This article addresses the need to formulate a uniform and predictable

approach to the admissibility of expert opinion testimony which relates the law
to the facts. First, it briefly discusses the history of expert opinion testimony.
Second, it discusses, through a case analysis, the difficult, if not impossible task
that courts have assumed in attempting to differentiate between two types of
expert opinions: (1) those which are, by their nature, factual; and (2) those
which require some level of legal analysis-directly relating the law to the facts
of the case. 9 Finally, this article suggests an alternative approach which is
arguably more consistent with the goals of Article VII of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.

in evidence, but only with the expenditure of substantial time in
producing and examining various authenticating witnesses.
Id.
7

FED. R. EVID. 704(a): "[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact."
The advisory committee's note states, in part:
The basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is
to admit them when helpful to the trier of fact. In order to render
this approach fully effective and to allay any doubt on the subject,
the so-called "ultimate issue" rule is specifically abolished by the
instant rule ....
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars
so as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must
be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of
evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances
against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury
what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an
earlier day.
FED. R. EvID. 704 advisory committee's note.
8

1n the wake of Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993),
many recent cases concern the admissibility of expert opinions based on scientific
theories that have not gained "general acceptance" in the scientific community. This
article does not endeavor to discuss the Daubertissues, as those issues are unrelated to
the focus of this discussion-the admissibility of the expert's "legal" conclusion.
9
This article does not attempt to discuss expert opinions on purely legal issues. For
an excellent discussion of such expert testimony, see Note, Expert Testimony, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 797 (1984); see also Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 509 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977) (expert was not allowed to testify as to the legal
meaning of "best efforts" in the context of securities law).
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II. THE HISTORY OF EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY

Before jury trials were fully developed, expert testimony was used to settle
disputes in at least two circumstances. First, the court or the mayor, would call
people whose experience was especially relevant to the facts of the specific case
to serve as a "jury."lO Second, experts were often called before the court when
the court was unable to decide a technical issue on its own.1 1 For example, in
1352, in an appeal of mayhem, the court sought the advice of a group of London
surgeons to tell the court whether or not a wound was fresh.' 12 In the early
stages of the development of the jury trial system, it is unclear how much
weight the court actually gave to the conclusions of these pseudo-experts. By
the fourteenth century, however, the practice of having "experts" decide factual
issues was well established. 13
Judge Learned Hand cites the 1620 case of Alsop v. Bowtrell14 as "the first case
which I have found of real expert testimony. 15 In Alsop, the conclusions of an
expert were actually submitted to a true jury. The issue turned upon whether
or not a child born to a woman forty weeks and nine days after her husband's
death, could, in fact, belong to the deceased husband. 16 The expert testified that
10 Learned Hand, Historicaland PracticalConsiderationsRegarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARV. L. REV. 40, 40-41 (1901).
For examples where the mayor summoned the jury of experts:
Fishing nets with meshes smaller than those required by the trade
ordinance: Riley, pp. 107 (1313), 135 (1320), 214 (1343), 219 (1344),
220 (1344), 483 (1385), 486 (1386). Improper tanning of hides: Riley,
pp. 135 (1320), 420 (1378). False tapestry: Riley, pp. 260 (1350),
375 (1374). Improper hats and caps: Riley, pp. 90 (1311), 529 (1391).
False pewter vessels: Ripley, p. 259 (1350). False gloves: Riley, p. 249
(1350). False wine: Riley, p. 318 (1364).
Id. at 41 n.3.
Selling putrid victuals, the prosecution being apparently public, no
complainant appearing in the case: Riley, pp. 328 (1365), 408 (1377),
448 (1381), 471 (1382), 516 (1390). Selling putrid victuals, private prosecution: Riley, pp. 226 (1351), 464 (1382). Malpractice by a surgeon,
whether the prosecution was public or private does not appear: Riley,
p. 273 (1354).
Id. at 42, n.1.
11

1d. at 42.

2

1 Id.at 42-43 n.3.
13

1d. at 42. The practice of having experts decide factual issues still exists today in
certain contexts. Consider, for example, the use of tribunals to screen medical
malpractice claims. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. L. ch. 231, § 60B (1975).
14

CRO. JAC 541 (1620).

15

Hand, supra note 10, at 45-46. Judge Hand noted the following: "[T]he witnesses
are not stated to have been called on either side; and from the meager report we have,
they seem to have satisfied the court in the first instance of the truth of their conclusion
before the evidence went to the jury."
16

1d. at 45.
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the child could belong to the deceased husband, and his conclusion was
17
presented to the jury.
Professor Wigmore cites an early, somewhat troubling, circumstance where
a "decipherer"18 gave an opinion in a criminal case19 without offering any
grounds whatsoever for his opinion. 2 0 In that case, based solely and exclusively
21
upon the decipherer's opinion, the defendant was hanged.
Despite what appeared to be a growing trend toward the admission of expert
testimony, the practice began to meet with resistance as early as the seventeenth
century.22 In 1622, Lord Coke declared that "[iut is no satisfaction for a witness
,23
to say that he 'thinketh' or 'persuadeth himself ....
24
By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the so-called "opinion rule"
became the subject of increasing scrutiny.25 Professor Wigmore suggests that
26
this was caused, in part, by the promulgation of several "erroneous theories."
One of these theories, the theory on the "ultimate issue," rapidly gained support
27
among courts and commentators and in fact remains unsettled today. That
theory set forth the notion that an expert could not offer testimony on the
ultimate issue to be decided by the jury because to do so would "usurp the
28
jury's function."
Others advanced even more stringent notions. One judge went so far as to
say that "[o]pinions, belief, deductions from facts, and such like, are matters

17Id.
18John H. Wigmore, Proof By Comparison of Handwriting, 30 AM. L. REV. 481, 494
(1896).
19

R. v. Cator, 4 Esp. 117 (1802).
20Wigmore, supra note 18, at 494-95.
21

ld.

22
Maury R. Olicker, Special Topics In The Law Of Evidence: The Admissibility of Expert
Witness Testimony: Time to Take the Final Leap?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831,836 (1988).
23
7John H. Wigmore, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1917, at 2 a. Chadbom
rev. 1978) (quoting Adamsv. Canon, 1 Dyer 53b, 73 Eng. Rep. 117 n.15 (K.B. 1622) (Coke,
J.)). Commentators seem to agree that Lord Coke was probably addressing the hearsay
rule when he made this statement. Nevertheless, this statement and statements like it
formed the basis of what was to be called the "opinion rule." See id. See also Mason Ladd,

Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 415 (1952).
24

Although the opinion rule may be variously described, generally courts and
commentators argued that it was exclusively the jury's role to draw inferences from
facts, and that it was improper for a witness to state an opinion including inferences or
conclusions.
25

See Wigmore, supra note 23,

26

1d.

27

See discussion infra sections III.A.1, LI.A.2.

28

Wigmore, supra note 23, § 1921, at 21-22.

§§ 1917-1923, at 6-29.

§§ 1919-1923, at 14-29.
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which belong to thejury... ,"29 a rule which no doubt, if adopted, would have
entirely eliminated the use of expert testimony (the rule would have essentially
limited the expert to testifying as to his or her own observations, and thus, the
expert would not have been allowed to offer anything more than would a lay
witness).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, in the nineteenth century,
commentators like Dean Mason Ladd strongly supported the use of expert
testimony in certain circumstances. 30 Dean Ladd differentiated between expert
testimony that was rooted in scientific analysis and that which was not.31 He
even went so far as to state that the court should direct a verdict in a case where
an expert testified that a man was not the father of a child based solely upon
an expert's testimony concerning the reliability of a blood test.32
In the midst of this web of common law confusion, Professor Wigmore
advocated a simple, singular principal: does the proffered testimony help? 33
In addressing the use of expert testimony, he argued that the testimony should
be admitted on a case-by-case basis by applying a simple three-part test:
[1] Is it a topic as to which the witness as such needs a special
experience above the ordinary, and [2] if so, does he [the witness] have
this? ... [and 3] Does the jury need any inference from the witness, either
because of his skill or because his observed data cannot be adequately
reproduced by him?34
It is worth noting that the advisory committee's note to Federal Rule 704 sets
forth "helpfulness" as the basic premise in determining whether or not to admit
both lay and expert testimony.3 5 Thus, one might be tempted to believe that
the drafters were heavily influenced by Professor Wigmore's position. 36 What
is clear is that the drafters' ultimate goal was to structure a series of rules which
would eliminate the potpourri that had grown up out of the common law and,
in doing so, to provide a sound basis for judicial decisionmaking and to foster
uniformity within the judicial system. 37 Rather than adopting Wigmore's
three-part test for analyzing each case, however, the drafters promulgated a
more general, seemingly straightforward approach in Rules 702-705.

29
1d. § 1920, at 18 (quoting Lincoln v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R., 23 Wend. 425,
432 (N.Y. 1840) (Nelson, C.J.)).

30See Ladd, supra note 23, at 421.
31

Id.

32

ld.

33

See Wigmore, supra note 23, § 1923, at 29.

34

Id. § 1925, at 35.

35

See, Fed. R. 704, advisory committee's note, supra note 7.

36

See Olicker, supra note 22, at 838.

37

See generally, FED. R. EVID. 704, advisory committee's note, supra note 7.
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Rules 702 and 704 do seem to recapitulate Wigmore's basic notion. 38 Judges
have not been swayed, however, by the relatively simplistic tenor of the Rules;
a brief review of the cases dispels any notion that the confusion which existed
at common law has been resolved.3 9 As was the case at common law, the courts
are particularly troubled by opinion testimony. The common law theories that
Professor Wigmore criticized 40 still live on, as courts struggle to differentiate
between "facts," "opinions" and "legal conclusions." Despite the
implementation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, with their liberalization and
simplification of expert testimony law, courts continue to be troubled by the
admission of expert opinion testimony and have taken upon themselves, with
little guidance from the Rules, the arduous task of determining what opinions
should be admissible and what opinions should not-a process not unlike that
41
which existed at common law.

III. THE PURPORTED STANDARD
A. The Admissibility of Expert Opinion Testimony in Federal Courts
1. Introduction
The threshold question in determining whether or not an expert's testimony
is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence is helpfidness. The court must
first be convinced that the testimony may help the jury to "understand the
evidence or determine a fact in issue." 42 Second, pursuant to the Federal Rules,
the court must determine that the testimony will not waste the jury's time or
simply tell the jury what result to reach. 43 Having passed these preliminary
hurdles, however, does not ensure that the proffered testimony will be
admissible. The advisory committee's note to Rule 704 states one additional
criterion: "opinions phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria"
are inadmissible. 44
But what exactly is such an opinion? While the drafters of the Federal Rules
failed to offer an explanation, they did provide the following example:
"Did T have the capacity to make a will?" would be excluded, while
the question, "Did Thave sufficient mental capacity to know the nature

38

See generally, FED. R. EVID. 702-704.

39

See discussion infra section IH.A.2.

40

See Wigmore, supra note 23, §§ 1919-1923, at 14-29.

41See discussion ifra section Ill.A.2.
42

See FED R. EVID. 702, supra note 5.

43

See FED. R. EviD. 704 advisory committee's note, supra note 7. See also FED. R. EvID.

403.
44

1d.
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and extent of his property and the natural objects of his bounty and
4 5 to
allowed.
be
would
distribution?"
of
scheme
rational
a
formulate
Generally speaking, courts have interpreted these comments to mean that an
expert can render an opinion that is based on his analysis of the facts, 46 but that
an expert cannot render an opinion that is based on his interpretation of the
law. 4 7 The expert can even give an opinion on the ultimate issue,4 8 so long as
the opinion is based upon the expert's analysis of the facts and not based on

45

1d.

46

As a practical consideration, distinguishing between "fact" and "opinion" is an
impossible task. Consider the following:
[N]o such distinction [between fact and opinion] is scientifically
possible. We may in ordinary conversation roughly group distinct
domains for "opinion" on the one hand and "fact" or "knowledge"
on the other; but as soon as we come to analyze and define these
terms for the purpose of that accuracy which is necessary in legal
rulings, we find that the distinction vanishes, that a flux ensues,
and that nearly everything which we choose to call "fact" either is
or may be only "opinion" or inference.
...If then our notion of the supposed firm distinction between
"opinion" and "fact" is that the one is certain and sure, the other not,
surely a just view of their psychological relations serves to demonstrate that in strict truth nothing is certain.... [If... the test is whether
"doubt can reasonably exist," then certainly it must be perceived that
the multiple doubts which ought to exist would exclude vast masses of
indubitably admissible testimony.... [If... "opinion" is inference and
fact is "original perception," then it may be understood that no such
distinction can scientifically be made, since the processes of knowledge
and the sources of illusion are the same for both. It is impossible, then
(supposing it were desirable), to confine witnesses to some fancied
realm of "knowledge" or "fact" and to forbid them to enter the domain
of "opinions" or inferences. There are no such contrasted groups of
certain and uncertain testimony, and there never can be.
Wigmore, supra note 23, § 1919, at 14-16.
[Flew persons ever think that what are rightly called facts are at the
same time no more nor less than conclusions. Thus, impressions of
cold or heat, light and darkness, size, shape, distance, speed, and
many personal qualities, physical and mental, are constantly acted
on as facts, although not uniformly judged by all observers, for the
simple reason that the facts cannot be otherwise communicated.
Id. at 17 (quoting Kelley v. Richardson, 436, 37 N.W. 514, 516 (Mich. 1888) (Campbell,

J.)).

All evidence is opinion merely, unless you choose to call it fact and
knowledge, as discovered by and manifested to the observation of
the witness.
Id. (quoting Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N.H. 227, 241 (1875) (Foster, C.J.)).
47

See Olicker, supra note 22, at 864.

48

FED. R. EVID. 704, supra note 7.
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the expert's application of the law to the facts. In other words, an expert cannot

render what has been called an impermissible legal conclusion. 49
Those who support the exclusion of these so-called impermissible legal
conclusions do so generally on the basis of one of two grounds. First, some
argue that such testimony "usurps the authority of the judge."50 They argue
that the court cannot assume that the expert's interpretation and application
of the law will be the same as the judge's.51 Thejudge must be the sole authority
on the law, and thus, testimony which addresses "the law" should be
inadmissible. 52 Second, others argue that such testimony "usurps the role of
the jury."53 They contend that because the jury is the trier of fact, and has the
task of applying the law to the facts to reach a conclusion and a verdict, the
expert should not be permitted to tell the jury what result it should reach. 54
As a practical consideration, however, issues do not come neatly labeled as
permissible "factual conclusions" and impermissible "legal conclusions."
Furthermore, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not state that
expert witnesses could not render a legal conclusion; rather, the drafters stated
that the witness's opinion was not to be couched in terms of "inadequately
explored legal criteria." 55 It is doubtful that the drafters intended to admit or
exclude expert opinion testimony based on some artificial notion which
improperly places the emphasis on form as opposed to substance 56 and, this
unquestionably creates confusion in the courts.

49 McCoRMIcK ON EVIDENCE § 12, at 32 (3d ed. West 1984).
50See discussion infra section M.A.2.
5lid.
52But see generally, Note, Expert Testimony, supra note 9.
53

See Wigmore, supra note 23, § 1921, at 21-22.

4

5 But see Wigmore, supra note 18, § 1920, at 18-19:
This phrase is made to imply a moral impropriety or a tactical
unfairness in the witness' expression of opinion. In this aspect
the phrase is so misleading, as well as so unsound, that it should
be entirely repudiated. It is a mere bit of empty rhetoric. There is
no such reason for the rule, because the witness, in expressing his
opinion, is not attempting to "usurp" the jury's function; nor could
he if he desired. He is not attempting it, because his error (if it were
one) consists merely in offering to the jury a piece of testimony
which ought not to go there; and he could not usurp it if he would,
because the jury may still reject his opinion and accept some other
view, and no legal power, not even the judge's order, can compel
them to accept the witness' opinion against their own.
55

See FED. R. EID. 704 advisory committee's note, supra note 7 (emphasis added).

6

5 See Note, Expert Testimony, supra note 9, at 800. See also discussion infra section
lfl.A.2.
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2. Case Analysis
As is demonstrated by a review of the cases, courts have wrestled and
continue to wrestle with the difference between what they have deemed to be
permissible "factual conclusions" and impermissible "legal conclusions." As
Justice Fay so aptly noted: "[m]ore recent decisions underscore the lamentable
fact that the adoption of Rule 704 did not totally dispel the confusion over the
57
admissibility of expert opinions arguably amounting to conclusions of law."
Consider, for example, the admissibility of expert opinion testimony on the
58
issue of discrimination. In Davis v. Combustion Eng'g., Inc., an expert testified
that the plaintiff-employee had been discriminated against on the basis of his
age. 59 The trial court admitted the testimony, and the jury found the
defendant-employer liable for a wilful violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.60 On appeal, the employer argued that the expert's
61
testimony was based on an improper legal conclusion. The Sixth Circuit held,
however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
challenged testimony, in which the expert stated that the plaintiff "appears to
be [sic] discriminated against" and that the termination was "because of his
age."62 The court reasoned that these "are simply opinions which embrace an
ultimate fact."63 With respect to the expert's testimony regarding unlawful age
discrimination, however, the court opined that the testimony was
in
impermissible, reasoning that such testimony was an "opinion phrased
64
terms of inadequately explored legal criteria," i.e. a legal conclusion.
A careful examination of the Sixth Circuit's analysis demonstrates its flawed
reasoning. The process required to determine whether a person has been
"discriminated against... because of his age" and the process required to
determine whether or not those same acts constitute "unlawful age
discrimination," are exactly the same. In both instances one must apply the legal
standard of discrimination to the specific facts of the case, and in the end, one
65
reaches a legal conclusion in either circumstance.
57

Haney v. Mizell Mem. Hosp., 744 F.2d 1467, 1474 n.7 (11th Cir. 1984) (the
admissibility of expert testimony couched in legal terms is not clear).
58742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984).
59

1d. at 919.

6029 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. (1967).
61

Davis, 742 F.2d at 918.

62

1d. at 919-20.

63

Id. at 919.

Id. at 919-20. For a description of the alleged improperly admitted testimony, see
id. at 918 n.1.
65
For an example of similar reasoning, see Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649
F.2d 816, 820-21 (10th Cir. 1981)(expert testimony that there were only 42 chances out
of a million that the composition of the neighborhood could have occurred without dis64
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Perhaps recognizing its own inconsistencies, the next year, in Torresv. County
of Oakland,66 a case which addressed the issue of racial discrimination, the Sixth
Circuit held that testimony which set forth the opinion that the plaintiff "had
been discriminated against" could be excluded, and this time the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that such testimony constituted a legal conclusion.6 7 The Eighth
Circuit followed 68 and, in citing Torres,69 also excluded testimony on the issue
of discrimination. 70 Using the Sixth Circuit's reasoning, that court noted that
opinion testimony is inappropriate if it is couched in terminology which has a
"separate, distinct, and special legal meaning." 71 The Eighth Circuit apparently
recognized the problems inherent in distinguishing between these so-called
factual and legal conclusions, noting that the "task of separating questions
calling for permissible factual72responses from those calling for impermissible
legal conclusions is not easy."
If expert testimony was truly admitted or excluded based upon whether the
court believed that the proffered testimony constituted a factual conclusion as
opposed to a legal conclusion, then testimony concerning the breach of a legal
standard would clearly be inadmissible. Such testimony is plainly a legal
conclusion under the analysis federal courts attempt to apply pursuant to Rule
704.73 Courts, however, have failed to follow this simple, logical analysis.
In a suit for negligence, for example, one must prove the existence of a legal
duty, that the legal standard has been breached, and that the breach caused an
injury.74 Consider, however, the disparity in the admission of expert testimony

crimination was allowed, but testimony on the ultimate issue of whether discrimination
actually occurred was excluded).
66758 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1985).
67

1d. at 151. The question asked of the witness was whether "Torres had been
discriminated against because of her national origin." Id.
68
See Hogan v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 812 F.2d 409, 411-12 (8th Cir. 1987)
(determination of whether or not acts were discriminatory requires an application of
the law to the facts and is inadmissible because it is the judge's role to render instructions
on the law).
It should be noted that in both Torres and in Hogan the excluded testimony was lay
witness testimony as opposed to expert witness testimony. The court in each case,
however, failed to distinguish the testimony on that ground.
69758 F.2d at 147.
70812 F.2d at 411.
71
72
73

Id.
d. at 412.
See discussion supra section III.A.1.

74W.PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984)

§ 30, at 164-65.
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on the application of the legal standards of "breach of duty" and "causation" in
the following cases. In Neilson v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 75 the Eighth Circuit held
that an expert's testimony that the defendant's improper manufacturing
processes "caused" a tire to be defective was permissible, admitting what was
clearly a legal conclusion, and the conclusion that the plaintiff would ask the
jury to reach. 76 On the other hand, in Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,77 in attempting
to determine whether or not the plaintiff's own negligence was a contributing
factor in a personal injury suit, the expert witness was not allowed to testify
that the plaintiff was "the cause of the accident. " 78
In Parkerv. Williams,79 after having noted that an opinion which constitutes
a legal conclusion was inadmissible, the Eleventh Circuit allowed the expert to
testify that the defendant was "grossly negligent," unquestionably a legal
standard. 80 But in Berry v. City of Detroit,8 1 the Sixth Circuit held that the trial
court erred when it allowed an expert in police policies and practices to testify
that the Detroit Police Department's "failure to direct and discipline and train
gross
their officers not to use improper deadly force constitute[d] a pattern of 82
conclusion.
a
legal
was
testimony
such
that
grounds
the
negligence," on
75570 F.2d 272 (8th Cir. 1978).
76
1d. at 276.
77698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1983).
78

Id. at 240.

79855 F.2d 763 (11th Cir. 1988).
1d. at 777. The question asked of the expert and his answer were as follows:
Question: Do you have an opinion about whether [Williams] being
employed by the Macon County Jail as Chief Jailer is grossly
negligent or not?
Dr. Beto answered: Consider it grossly negligent.
Note the jury instruction:
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in the case that
Plaintiff has proved her claim that Sheriff Lucius Amerson was
grossly negligent in employing James Michael Williams as a jailer
in Macon County jail, and that Sheriff Amerson's gross negligence
was a proximate cause of the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff's
constitutional rights by James Michael Williams, ... your verdict
must be for the Plaintiff against Defendant Macon County and
Lucius Amerson.
Id.
8125 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994).
80

82

1d. at 1354. The exchange occurred as follows:
[Question:] With regard to the history of pattern and practices of the
Detroit Police Department, do you believe the Detroit Police Department has had a past pattern and practice of condoning the use of
improper deadly force?
[Answer:] It's my opinion that their failure to direct and discipline and
train their officers not to use improper deadly force constitute [sic] a
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In the criminal context, particularly in drug-related cases where the issue is
whether the defendant possessed an illegal substance for "personal use" or with
the "intent to distribute," courts consistently admit expert testimony to support
the charge of "intent to distribute" despite the fact that such testimony clearly
draws a legal conclusion on the exact issue on which the jury will be asked to
render a verdict.83 The reasoning in decisions on this issue is highly disparate.
For example, in United States v. Ruggiero,84 the Second Circuit allowed an
expert who had carried out and supervised narcotic investigations for sixteen
85
years to testify that the defendant "possessed heroin with the intent to sell.'
The court's reasoning was, at best, curious: it stated that the witness's
testimony was not couched in terms of the applicable legal criteria. 86 The expert
testified, however, that the defendant "possessed heroin with the intent to sell,"
and the defendant was convicted of "possession of heroin with intent to
distribute."87 Plainly, the witness's testimony was an almost verbatim recitation
of the issue before the jury.
The Eighth Circuit admitted similar expert testimony in United States v.
Kelly,88 it did so, however, based on entirely different reasoning. The Kelly court
attempted to distinguish between "permissible" and "impermissible" legal
conclusions, reasoning that the words "'possess with intent to distribute,' are
commonly used and their plain meaning matches their legal meaning."89 Thus,
such testimony does not invade the province of the jury, and so it constitutes a
"permissible" legal conclusion. 90
In admitting the same sort of expert testimony, the Seventh Circuit, in United
States v. Lipscomb,9 1 opted not to articulate its reasons for admitting testimony
that clearly set forth a legal conclusion. 92 And finally, the Sixth Circuit, in what
pattern of gross negligence in my opinion, yes.
Id. at 1353 n.12.
83
See infra text accompanying notes 84-94.
84928 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub norn. Gotti v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
372 (1991).
85

d. at 1305.

86Id.
87

1d. at 1289.

88679 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1982).
89

d. at 136.

90

d.

9114 F.3d 1236 (7th Cir. 1994).
92

1d. While the court mentioned Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a), its discussion was
centered around the implications of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). It is interesting to
note that the court reasoned, first of all, that the witness was not rendering an opinion
on the defendant's "actual mental state" but instead was drawing an inference from the
circumstances. Secondly, the courtnoted thatRule 704(b) does not apply to all witnesses.
In citing the House Judiciary Committee, the court stated that the rule is limited to
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might be the most curious decision of all, United States v. Starnes,93 reasoned
that expert testimony on the defendant's intent to distribute marijuana was a
94
factual conclusion as opposed to a legal one.
In products liability cases, where the allegation is breach of warranty under
the U.C.C. 95 or strict liability in tort under Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402(A), 96 a breach of the legal standard occurs when the product is deemed
to be "unreasonably dangerous." 97 Consider expert testimony offered on this
legal standard.
In Strong v. E.I. DuPont deNemours Co.,98 the Eighth Circuit held that the trial
court properly excluded expert testimony on the issue of whether or not the
product was "unreasonably dangerous," 99 reasoning that the question was

witnesses whose opinions rely on medical analysis, i.e., psychiatrists and other mental
health experts. Id. at 1239-43; see discussion infra section I.A.3.
93
No. 93-5931, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 12505 (6th Cir. May 26, 1994), cert. denied, 63
U.S.L.W. 3347 (Oct. 31, 1994).
94
1d. The exchange was as follows:
"Now, as somebody who has been in the marijuana business
yourself, is [thirty-five to forty pounds of marijuana] a quantity
you would associate with personal use or a quantity you would
associate with distribution?"
"The defendant objected, arguing that the government be required
to qualify the witness a little bit further."
In response, the government argued that Mr. Godair was testifying
based on his extensive personal experience in the marijuana business.
The court overruled the objection, and Mr. Godair stated that such an
amount would normally be associated with distribution.
Mr. Godair was then asked this question: "Say you were going to
buy some marijuana for your personal use, how much would you
buy at one time?".. .Godair testified that if he were buying marijuana
for personal use, he would buy one-quarter of an ounce.
Id. at *5.
95U.C.C. § 2-314 (1990).
96

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965).

97

Section 402(A) provides in part: "(1) One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property.... Id.
In Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (1978), the Massachusetts Court held
that warranty law as expressed in theUniform Commercial Code, enacted as Mass. Gen.
L. ch. 106, § 2-314, is entirely congruent with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(A).
98667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1981).
99
1d. at 686. Dr. Harrison had testified in offers of proof that the "communications
from Dupont and Norton McMurray to NNG did not provide adequate warning and
instructions" and stated as well that "the lack of adequate warnings and instructions
constituted defects which made the products unreasonably dangerous." Id. at 685. When
the plaintiff sought to elicit this testimony at trial, the defendants objected a number of
times and the trial judge sustained their objections. Id.
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phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria and called for an
answer which was an impermissible legal conclusion.10 0 The Tenth Circuit,
however, in Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 10 1 reasoned that the expert could testify
that the product was "unreasonably dangerous beyond the expectation of the
average user" because "[tihe legal terms used [were] not so complex or shaded
with subtle meaning as to be beyond the understanding of the average
person[.]" 102 The court appeared to be attempting to distinguish between
"permissible" and "impermissible" legal conclusions on the basis that expert
testimony is acceptable if the jury can understand it.103
The Second Circuit used a similar, but not identical, means to determine
whether or not an expert's testimony was admissible in In re Air Disasterat
Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988,104 a case including an allegation that
the defendants were involved in "wilful misconduct." The court reasoned that
the expert was properly allowed to testify that the defendants engaged in
"fraud" and "deceit," because the legal terms were used in a non-legal sense, 10 5
an analysis similar to the Eighth Circuit's analysis in United States v. Kelly. 10 6
In Fiataruolo v. United States,1 07 the issue was whether or not the two
defendants had so much authority over a family-run construction contracting
business that they should be held responsible for payment of federal
withholding taxes. 108 The expert was allowed to testify that one of the two
defendants was not the "responsible party."10 9 The court noted that the
testimony was acceptable because it was not merely "a simple statement on

100ld.

101817 F.2d 1452 (10th Cir 1987).
10 2
Id. at 1459.
10 3

See id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1980)).

10437 F.3d 804 (2nd Cir. 1994).
105Id. at 825-27.
106679 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1982).
1078 F.3d 930 (2d Cir. 1993).
108
109

d. at 933.
1d. at 935. The question and answer were as follows:
[Question:] "Based on your review of the [Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co.] account and your own experience with the Internal
Revenue Service as a certified public accountant, have you come
to an opinion as to whether Angelo Fiataruolo was a responsible
person with respect to... withholding taxes due and payable?"
[Answer:] "Based on the evidence that I looked at and the work
that I did, I did not believe that Mr. Fiataruolo was a responsible
party in connection with this matter."
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how [the jury's] verdict should read" and because it was not "a simple bald
assertion of the law."110
Numerous other cases discuss these varying analyses as applied to countless
other phrases, all with equally disparate results, in the same fashion as the cases
described above.111 These cases make it disconcertingly clear that the erroneous
110

Id. at 942.
See, e.g., the following cases where the proffered testimony was held to constitute

11 1

an impermissible legal conclusion: Estes v. Moore, 993 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1993)
(expert testimony in a § 1983 suit on whether "probable cause" existed for an arrest);
Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359,363-64 (2d Cir. 1992) (expert testimony in a civil rights suit
for "police misconduct" that the police officer's conduct was not "justified under the
circumstances"); Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537,1541 (11th Cir.
1990) (expert testimony that insurer had a "duty" to hire tax counsel); Shahid v. Detroit,
889 F.2d 1543,1547-48 (6th Cir. 1989) (expert testimony in a civil rights suit on whether
correctional officers were "negligent"); Northern Heel Corp. v. Compo Indus., Inc., 851
F.2d 456, 468 (1st Cir. 1988) (expert testimony in a breach of contract suit that safety
hazards in plaintiff's factoriesviolated OSHA regulations); Kosteleckyv. NL AcmeTool,
837 F.2d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 1988) (expert testimony in a personal injury suit that the
plaintiff's injuries were "caused" by his own conduct); Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
814 F.2d 1481,1484-85 (10th Cir. 1987) (expert testimony in a suit by a coal miner against
his employer's parent corporation that acts or omissions of a corporation were "prudent
mine practices"); United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135,142 (2d Cir. 1988) (expert testimony
in a securities suit that the defendants were engaged in "manipulation" and a "scheme
to defraud"); Mitroff v. Xomox Corp., 797 F.2d 271,274 (6th Cir. 1986) (expert testimony
in an age discrimination suit that there was a "pattern of age discrimination"); Matthews
v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 770 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1985) (expert testimony in a personal
injury suit that the defendant's premises were "ultrahazardous" or "unreasonably
dangerous"); Federal Aviation Admin. v. Landy, 705 F.2d 624, 632 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 895 (1983) (expert testimony in a suit for violations of "Federal Aviation Safety
Act" on the "meaning" and "applicability" of the regulations); Stoler v. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 583 F.2d 896,898-99 (6th Cir. 1978) (expert testimony in a suit that involved
a collision between a train and an automobile that the railroad crossing was "extra
hazardous"); Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 911-13 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 961 (1979) (expert testimony in a patent infringement action that it would have been
obvious to mounta gas meter and powerbox and an electric meter on the samepedestal).
But see, e.g., the following cases where the proffered testimony was held to be
admissible: United States v. Van Dyke, 14 F.3d 415, 422-23 (8th Cir. 1994) (expert
testimony in a prosecution for bank fraud explaining "banking regulations"); Autoskill,
Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., 994 F.2d 1476, 1492-93 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 307 (1993) (expert testimony in a copyright action on what constituted protectable
and unprotectable portions of a computer program); Heflin v. Stewart County, 958 F.2d
709, 715-16 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 598 (1992) (expert testimony in a § 1983 suit
that sheriff's conduct in failing to cut down a detainee found hanging in his cell
constituted "deliberate indifference"); Samples v. Atlanta, 916 F.2d 1548,1551 (11th Cir.
1990) (expert testimony that a police officer acted "reasonably"); Ponder v. Warren Tool
Corp., 834 F.2d 1553, 1556-57 (10th Cir. 1987) (expert testimony in a personal injury suit
that the defendant's tire "caused" the accident); United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397,
399 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986) (expert testimony in a heroin
prosecution that defendant was a "steerer"); Simon v. St. Louis County, 735 F.2d 1082,
1084 (8th Cir. 1984) (expert testimony in a reinstatement action against a police
department on the "reasonableness" of police department requirements); United States
v. Kelly, 679 F.2d 135,135-36 (8th Cir. 1982) (expert testimony in a drug prosecution that
the cocaine was possessed with the "intent to distribute"); United States v. Dozier, 672
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112
theories which Professor Wigmore noted at common law are alive and well,
and that these theories are used to support a wide range of analyses, none of
which promote the spirit of the Federal Rules with respect to expert opinion

testimony.

113

3. The Implications of Federal Rule 704(b)
The very existence of Rule 704(b) implies that federal courts have
misinterpreted Rule 704(a), and, in doing so, improperly excluded so-called
"impermissible legal conclusions." 114 Rule 704(b) states:

F.2d 531, 542 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982) (testimony in a RICO and Hobbs
Act prosecution that witnesses made or refused to make payments because such
payments were sought through "duress" and "bribery"); Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778,
783 (8th Cir. 1981),afl'd on othergroundssub nom. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (expert

testimony in an inmate's civil rights action against prison officials alleging negligence
that the placing of persons in cells without checking their backgrounds was an
"egregious failure"); United States v. Logan, 641 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir. 1981) (expert
testimony in a prosecution for embezzlement that "the funds were improperly taken");
United States v. Oles, 994 F.2d 1519,1522-23 (10th Cir. 1993) (testimony in a prosecution
for bank fraud that the defendants had engaged in check kiting in order to perpetrate a
"fraud"); United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1980) (expert
testimony in a prosecution for assault resulting in"serious bodily harm" that the victim
had suffered "serious bodily injury"); United States v. Miller, 600 F.2d 498,500 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955 (1979) (expert testimony in a prosecution for interstate
transportation of securities by fraud that funds were "misapplied'); United States v.
McCauley, 601 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1979) (expert testimony in a prosecution for
possession of an unregistered machine gun that the gun was "required to be registered
under the statute'); United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978) (expert testimony in a prosecution for bank robbery that the
defendant did not "act under fear of death or grave bodily harm" but instead acted
"voluntarily"); United States v. Masson, 582 F.2d 961, 964-65 (5th Cir. 1978) (expert
testimony in a prosecution for illegal gambling that the defendant was a
"sub-bookmaker"); United States v. Milton, 555 F.2d 1198, 1204 (5th Cir. 1977) (expert
testimony in a suit for illegal gambling that the defendants' transactions were "part of
the gambling business").
1 12

See Wigmore, supra note 23, §§ 1919-1923, at 14-29.

1 13

See FED. R. EVID. 703, supra note 6.

1 14

Additional support for the federal courts' misinterpretations of Rule 704(a) is
found in the Supreme Court's analysis of the "public records exception" to the hearsay
rule. See FED. R. EvID. 803(8). In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988), the
Court held that a written opinion which could be considered to be a legal conclusion
was admissible. That case concerned a Navy airplane which crashed, resulting in the
death of a flight instructor and her student. At trial, the court admitted an investigative
report by the Judge Advocate General Corps which stated that pilot error was most
likely the "cause" of the accident. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's
decision and remanded for a new trial, holding that the "opinions" or "conclusions"
contained in the report should have been excluded. On rehearing en banc, the Eleventh
Circuit was evenly divided, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
issue. Id. at 159-61.
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that "neither
the language of the Rule nor the intent of its framers calls for a distinction between 'fact'
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No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or
inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental
state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a
thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact
defense
115
alone.

The Rule clearly identifies a very limited, specific circumstance in which expert
testimony that constitutes a legal conclusion is inadmissible. The Rule only
excludes testimony in criminal cases offered to show the defendant's state of
its nature, it
mind as it directly relates to the claim or defense at issue; and by 116
only applies to medical experts, in particular, psychiatric experts.
Congress intended that Rule 704(b) limit certain medical testimony only, and
for a specific articulated reason. 117 The Senate Judiciary Committee report
noted that "under [proposed Rule 704(b)], expert psychiatric testimony would
be limited to [psychiatrists] presenting and explaining their diagnoses."'118 The
Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that the reason for such limits on expert
testimony was stated by the American Psychiatric Association as follows:11 9
It is clear that psychiatrists are experts in medicine, not the law. As
such, it is clear that the psychiatrist's first obligation and expertise in
the courtroom is to "do psychiatry," i.e., to present medical information
and opinion about the defendant's mental state and motivation and to
explain in detail the reason for his medical-psychiatric conclusions.
When, however, "ultimate issue" questions are formulated by the law
and put to the expert witness who must then say "yea" or "nay," then
the expert witness is required to make a leap in logic. He no longer
addresses himself to medical concepts but instead must infer or intuit
what is in fact unspeakable, namely, the probable relationship between
120
medical concepts and legal or moral constructs such as free will.

and 'opinion' [and such a conclusion] is strengthened by the analytical difficulty of
drawing such a line." Id. at 168. The Court reasoned that a "broad approach to
admissibility" with regard to Rule 803(8) is consistent with the Federal Rules of
Evidence's relaxed approach to opinion testimony, citing Rules 702-705. Id. at 169.
Additionally, the Court noted that "[a] common definition of 'finding of fact' is ... '[a]
conclusion by way of reasonable inference from the evidence."' Id. at 164 (citation
omitted).
115 FED.R. EVID. 704(b).
1 6

1 1d. See Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1239-43.

117S. Rep. No. 225, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. 230-31 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3412-13.
1 18
d. at 3412.
1 19

d. at 3413.

12 0

1d.
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When examined carefully, Rule 704(b) carves out a very narrow exception to
the general rule-an exception for one specific type of legal conclusion, thus
implying that only one exception exists.121 If all or some other legal conclusions
were to be inadmissible pursuant to Rule 704(a), then Rule 704(b) would be
unnecessary surplusage. Thus, it can be reasonably inferred that other types of
expert opinion testimony and, in particular, opinions which constitute what
the court has deemed to be "impermissible legal conclusions," are not barred
by the Federal Rules.
B. The Admissibility of Expert Opinion Testimony in MassachusettsState Courts
1. Introduction
Although Massachusetts has not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence,
Massachusetts courts seem to have embraced the spirit of the Federal Rules
with respect to expert opinion testimony which applies the law to the facts,
without becoming entwined in the federal courts' vicious circle of varying
analyses and disparate results. 122 Massachusetts judges tend to admit expert
testimony on the ultimate issue as set forth by the Federal Rules, 123 but unlike
the federal court judges, Massachusetts judges do not attempt to differentiate
artificially between permissible factual conclusions, sometimes permissible
legal conclusions, and sometimes impermissible legal conclusions. 12 4
Instead, they seem to focus on two issues: (1) whether or not the expert is
qualified to render an opinion on the subject at hand; and (2) whether or not
the subject matter of the proffered testimony is such that the jury will need help
in understanding it.125
2. Case Analysis
As early as 1955 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered the
question of the admissibility of the so-called "legal conclusion" in
Commonwealth v. Chapin.126 In that case, the prosecutor sought to admit
psychiatric testimony on the issue of the defendant's sanity.127 Defense counsel

121See id.; United States v. Didomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1172-73 (2d Cir. 1993);
Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1239-43; Olicker, supra note 22, at 885.
122
See discussion supra sections II.A.1, IH.A.2.
123See generally, FED. R. EVID. 704, advisory committee's note, parts of which are set
forth in note 7 supra.
124See discussion supra sections I.A.1, IH.A.2.
12 5See Commonwealth v. Gardner, 216 N.E.2d 558, 560-61 (Mass. 1966).
126132 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 857 (1956).
12 7
1t should be noted that in federal court this testimony might have properly been
excluded pursuant to Rule 704(b). See FED. R. EvID. 704(b) supra, text accompanying note
115. See also Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1239-43.
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objected that such testimony constituted a legal conclusion and, therefore, was
inadmissible. 128 The court responded as follows:
If the real ground of this assignment is that the answer to the question
is the precise point to be determined by the jury, this is not a valid
objection where the judge could find that the witness was qualified to
express an opinion in the domain129of professional knowledge which
would be of assistance to the jury.
In the cases that followed, the court reiterated such a standard, and expert
opinion testimony on the ultimate issue has remained admissible in
Massachusetts so long as the expert is qualified to render an opinion and such
13 0
an opinion is helpful to the jury.
Consider first the issue of whether or not an expert is qualified to render an
opinion. 131 In Commonwealth v. Gardner,132 for example, the court held that the
proffered testimony was rightfully excluded. The defendant was charged with
rape, and the prosecutor asked a gynecologist whether or not "there had been
a forcible entry."'133 In affirming the defendant's conviction, the court reasoned

12 8 Chapin, 132 N.E.2d at 413-14. The exchange was as follows:
[Question:] Now, what was your opinion, doctor, after a study as to
whether or not he was sane or insane at the time he committed this crime?
[Answer:] I believe that he was sane at that time. [Defense counsel
objected.] When asked to state the reason for his objection, the defendant's
counsel replied: "I believe that this testimony is of a medical man and
not a legal man, it is for the court and jury to decide the legal conclusion of sanity."
Id.
129 Chapin, 132 N.E.2d at 414.
130Having searched Supreme Judicial Court cases from 1899 to the present, I
encountered only two other instances where the Court discussed the admissibility of
testimony that it characterized as a legal conclusion. In both instances the testimony was
admitted. First, in Van Dyke v. Bixby, 448 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Mass. 1983), the issue was
whether or not a partnership existed. The Court admitted testimony that the two
defendants were "partners" to show their state of mind in attempting to enter the
partnership, noting the actual existence of the partnership was a legal conclusion to be
resolved by the jury. Then in Precourt v. Frederick, 481 N.E.2d 1144, 1149 (Mass. 1985),
an expert testified that the defendant physician "should have" made a disclosure that
he did not make to the patient. Once again, although the Court noted that the expert's
testimony constituted a legal conclusion, it was nevertheless admissible.
131

Cf. FED. R. EviD. 702, supra note 5.

132216 N.E.2d 558 (Mass. 1966).
133

1d. at 559-60. The physician was asked:
"Doctor, based upon your medical training and based upon your
observations of the person of this young lady and based upon...
[her] emotional state..., did you on that evening form an opinion
as to whether or not there had been a forcible entry?"
After stating that he had formed an opinion, the witness was permitted to state that he "thought that there was forcible entry."
Immediately thereafter, the judge asked the witness if he had been
given "a history from the patient as to what happened," and the
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that the testimony should have been excluded not because it usurped the role
of the judge or jury by setting forth a legal conclusion on the ultimate issue of
rape, but because the question required "the witness to base his opinion on
factors outside the area of his professional competence," that is to say, the
question required the witness to speculate. 34
In LaClair v. Silberline Mfg. Co., 135 the plaintiff brought a negligence suit
against an aluminum powder manufacturer alleging that its product was the
136
proximate cause of an explosion which resulted in the death of her husband.
She sought to admit expert testimony showing that the explosion was "caused
by the ignition of a cloud of aluminum powder."13 7 The testimony was
excluded, not because it constituted a legal conclusion, but because the expert
did not have adequate grounds for his opinion, and the opinion was therefore
138
speculative.
Testimony which the expert is qualified to give, on the other hand, is
admissible, assuming that such testimony is helpful to the jury. In
Commonwealth v. Montmeny,139 the court held that the expert testimony of a
physician who testified that a child had been "molested" was properly admitted
because the expert's testimony was based upon his own physical findings as
opposed to speculation. 140

witness stated that he had. The judge then asked him whether that
statement by the victim had formed "any part or basis of... [his]
opinion."
The witness answered, "Well, ... I would say yes."

Id. at 560.
134Id.
135393 N.E.2d 867 (Mass. 1979).
13 6

1d.

13 7

1d. at 874.

138

Id. at 873-74. The Court stated that "[e]xpert opinion, particularly when addressed
to a jury, must be based on either the expert's direct personal knowledge, on evidence
already in the record or which the parties represent will be presented during the course
of the trial, or on a combination of these sources." Id. (citing W.B. LEACH & P.J. LIACOS,
MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 100-01 (4th ed. 1967); I.G. MOTTLA, PROOF OF CASES IN
MASSACHUSETrS § 348 (2d. ed. 1966)).
139276 N.E.2d 688 (Mass. 1971).
140

1d. at 689-90. The physician performed a physical examination and in doing so
noted "vaginal abrasions," "dirt on her legs and thighs," "sensitivity to touch," etc. Id. at
689.
The pertinent questions and answers were as follows:
[Question:] "And Doctor, at the conclusion of your examination, did
you form an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical
certainty as to whether what you had seen was consistent with the
history that you obtained from this girl?... Do you have an opinion?
All I'm asking you is if you have an opinion, yes or no?"
[Answer:] "Yes, I do."
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On an appeal from a conviction of the murder and rape of a child in
Commonwealth v. Pikul,14 1 the defendant argued that the testimony of three
medical experts who stated that the defendant's daughter died of "asphyxia
during forced oral sexual assault" was improper.142 The defendant argued,
among other things, that the testimony was a direct opinion on the ultimate
issue, and that the opinion was beyond the expertise of the experts.143 The court

held, however, that the opinion testimony was properly admitted, stating that
"[t]he opinions of the experts were within the area of their expertise and not
based on conjecture and surmise. 144
Finally, in Sacco v. Roupenian,145 a medical malpractice action, the court again
held that the proffered testimony should have been admitted. 146 The plaintiffs
in Sacco alleged that the defendant physician was "negligent" in failing to
diagnose the decedent's breast cancer. 14 7 The trial court refused to allow the
plaintiff's expert to testify that the "average qualified surgeon" would have
diagnosed the breast cancer at the time of the biopsy.148 On appeal, however,
the court held that the testimony should have been admitted on the grounds
that such an opinion was within the purview of the expert. 149

[Question:] "What is your opinion, sir, within a reasonable degree
of medical certainty?"
[Answer:] "It certainly appears as though the girl had been molested."
Id. at 689 n.1.
141511 N.E.2d 336, 338-39 (Mass. 1987).
1421d. at 338.
14 31d. at 339.
144

1d. at 340.

145564 N.E.2d 386 (Mass. 1990).
14 6

1d. at 388-89.

147

1d. at 387.

14 8

/d. at 388.

14 9

1d. at 390. In a medical malpractice action, the physician's legal duty is to treat the
patient according to the standard of an average, qualified physician or specialist at the
time and place of the incident. The testimony in this case, regarding that standard of
care, was as follows:
"Do you have an opinion with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty as to whether the cancer which you have defined was
present in January, 1982, was likewise diagnosable?" Defense
counsel objected that there was insufficient basis for the question,
and that it was inappropriately phrased because "anything is
possible." At a sidebar conference, the plaintiffs' counsel offered to
rephrase the question to ask whether "the average qualified surgeon
in 1982 would have diagnosed this." The judge responded that
"[elven then, it's kind of far-fetched," and sustained the defendant's
objection.
564 N.E.2d at 388.
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If the court determines that the expert is qualified to testify, then the
testimony must pass an additional test: the testimony must be helpful to the
jury.150 The court has said that "[w]here the jury are [sic] equally capable of
drawing the conclusion sought from an expert witness, the expert's testimony
is inadmissible." 15 1
For example, in a claim by a tenant against her landlord for reckless infliction
of emotional distress, in Simon v. Solomon, 152 a psychiatrist was called to testify
on the issue of "emotional distress." 153 The psychiatrist testified that the tenant
"appeared sincere and honest."154 In upholding the trial court's decision to
admit the proffered testimony, the court reasoned that while an expert may not
state his opinion on matters that the jury is "equally competent to assess, such
as credibility of witnesses," in this case the opinion of the expert was helpful. 15 5
As part of his practice, the psychiatrist routinely assessed the truthfulness of
his patients, and he had interviewed the tenant. Thus, the court concluded that
his testimony was helpful to the jury in rendering its verdict.156
In Commonwealth v. Cruz, 157 a case of first degree murder, the court held that
an expert was properly allowed to testify to the effect that a blood-alcohol level
of .19 percent might have had on the defendant's mental processes. 158 In Cruz,
the court reasoned that apart from the proffered testimony, the jury might not
understand the effect of the alcohol on the defendant's state of mind.159
Despite the lack of written rules, Massachusetts courts seem to be cognizant
of the fact that the role of an expert witness should be to help the jury.
Massachusetts courts have moved beyond the cryptic and obscure notions set
forth in the federal courts' opinions. In a strikingly clear and simple summary,
the Supreme Judicial Court noted:
The role of an expert witness is to help the jury understand issues of
fact beyond their common experience. Under modem standards,
expert testimony on matters within the witness's field of expertise is
admissible whenever it will aid the jury in reaching a decision, even if

150

216 N.E.2d at 560.

151d. (citing New England Glass Co. v. Lovell, 7 Cush. 319 (1851); Commonwealth v.
Russ, 122 N.E. 176 (1919); Jackson v. Anthony, 185 N.E. 389 (Mass. 1933)).
152

Simon v. Solomon, 431 N.E.2d 556 (Mass. 1982).

153

1d. at 566.

154

Id.

15 5

1d.

156/d.

157602 N.E.2d 1089 (Mass. 1992).

1581d. at 1091.
159/. at 1092.
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the expert's opinion touches on the ultimate issues that the jury must
decide.

160

lV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION

A. Introduction
One need look no further than Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to
see the reason for a unified set of rules governing the law of evidence: "[t]hese
rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of

unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development
of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and

proceedings justly determined."161 With respect to expert opinion testimony,
however, the Federal Rules of Evidence as they have been interpreted by the
62
federal courts have fallen drastically short of meeting this goal.1
The federal courts' murky and elliptical approach used to determine
whether or not expert opinion testimony regarding mixed law and fact
questions should be admissible is hardly fair.163 The courts' focus on words
like "factual conclusion" and "legal conclusion" has resulted in poorly reasoned
and inconsistent decisions which improperly emphasize the form of the
testimony rather than its substance. These inconsistencies result in and almost
invite appeals. The ensuing "unjustifiable expense and delay" of litigation that
the Rules sought to eliminate grows. 164 It is time for the federal courts to
reevaluate the purpose for which expert testimony is admitted and to eliminate
decisions based on artificial labels. "Labeling testimony as a legal conclusion
in and of itself provides no meaningful guidance on either its admissibility or
any resulting prejudice." 165
B. Admissibility: Laying the ProperFoundationfor Expert Opinion Testimony
It is highly unlikely that anyone would disagree with the advisory
committee's note that testimony which is couched in "inadequately explored
legal criteria"'166 should not be admitted, and the trial judge should ensure
against the admission of testimony that is based upon unfamiliar or inapplic-

16 0Simon, 431 N.E.2d at 566.
16 1 FED. R. EVID. 102.
162

See discussion supra sections HI.A.1, Ifl.A.2.

63

1 See FED. R. EVID. 102.
164

Id.

165Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805,815 (10th Cir. 1988) (Seymour,J. dissenting)(arguing
that the admissibility of expert opinion testimony should be based on whether or not
the testimony created "actual prejudice").
166 Sce FED. R. EviD. 704, advisory committee's note. See also text accompanying notes
44-45.
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able legal grounds. 167 Such testimony could only confuse the jury. A blanket
prohibition on the admission of so-called "legal conclusions," however, is not
the answer. A straightforward analysis to determine admissibility must be
formulated.
The analysis used by Massachusetts state courts 168 serves as a good start for
creating a simple and direct test for admissibility, a test which is strikingly
similar to the one Professor Wigmore advocated: (1) the judge should
determine whether or not the expert is qualified to render an opinion on the
subject; (2) the judge should determine whether or not the expert's
understanding and acceptance of the law which may affect his opinion
comports with the law as the judge will instruct the jury; and, (3) the judge
should determine whether or not the proffered testimony will help the jury in
resolving the issue before it.169
1. Is the Expert Qualified?
First, the judge must determine whether or not the expert is qualified to
render an opinion on the subject matter which is before the court.170 To make
this determination the judge must examine the witness's qualifications in a
very narrow context, making certain his qualifications give him the necessary
means to testify on the exact issue before the court. For example, a gynecologist
will probably not be able to give a satisfactory opinion on lung cancer. Likewise,
not all psychiatrists may be able to discuss adequately the relatively narrow
disorder called "battered women's syndrome." Thus, it is important that the
trial judge first exercise the utmost care in examining expert qualifications.
2. Does the Expert Understand and Accept the Applicable
Legal Standard?
The judge must determine that the expert understands and accepts the legal
standard upon which the judge will instruct the jury.171 If the witness is to
render an opinion on "reasonableness" or on "causation," for example, the
witness must understand the implications of his statements so that he can
properly explain his opinion to the jury.
This might be accomplished very simply by a voir dire out of the presence
of the jury in which the judge or proffering counsel might ask the expert witness
a series of questions to determine whether or not the witness's understanding
167See discussion infra sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
168

See discussion supra sections IH.B.1, If.B.2.
1d.; Wigmore, supra note 23, § 1925, at 35.

169

170

See FED. R. EvID. 702, supra note 5; supra text accompanying notes 141-49; cf. supra
text accompanying notes 132-34.
1 71
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1247 (9th Cir. 1980) (expert
testimony was admissible where it was clear that the expert understood and applied
the proper legal standard).
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of the legal standard which may affect his opinion is entirely congruent with
the law as the court will instruct the jury. If the judge is not satisfied that the
expert understands the law or that the expert can properly apply the law to the
facts in the case, then, plainly the expert should not be allowed to render an
opinion. Conversely, if the expert exhibits a firm grasp of both the applicable
law and the facts of the case, he should be allowed to testify.
3. Is the Proffered Testimony Helpful?
Most importantly, the judge must determine whether or not the expert
opinion testimony may be helpful to the jury in resolving the issue before it. 172
Although there really can be no specific test, there are several important
considerations. First, the expert must have some sort of "knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education" 173 that is beyond the common experience
of the jury:
The true test of the admissibility of such testimony is not whether the
subject matter is common or uncommon, or whether many persons or
few have some knowledge of the matter, but it is whether the witnesses
offered as experts have any peculiar knowledge or experience, not
common to the world, which renders their opinions founded on such
determining
knowledge or experience
174 any aid to the Court or jury in
the question at issue.
[The] experience [must not be] of such a nature that it may be presumed
of all men of common education
to be within the common experience 175
moving in the ordinary walks of life.

When the consequences of actions or of combinations of circumstances
may only be known by those familiar with the subject, and cannot be
knowledge
understood by those not possessing skill or peculiar
176
evidence.
competent
are
experts
of
opinions
thereof,
As described above, the expert must be able to contribute something extra,
something more than the jury would otherwise have. If the witness's expertise

172

See FED. R. EVID. 702, supra note 5; supra text accompanying notes 150-59.

173

FED. R. EVID. 702, supra note 5.

74

1 Wigmore, supra note 23, § 1923, at 31-32 (quoting Taylor v. Monroe, 43 Conn. 36,
44 (1875) (Loomis, J.)).
17 51d. § 1924 at 32 (quoting New England Glass Co. v. Lovell, 7 Cush. 319, 321 (Mass.
1951)(Shaw, C.J.)).
17 6
1d. (quoting Hamilton v. Des Moines Valley R. R., 36 Iowa 31,37 (1872) (Beck, C.J.)).
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offers nothing more "peculiar 177 than that which may be admitted by lay
witness testimony, the expert's testimony is unnecessary.
Second, the expert must do more than set forth the conclusions; the expert
must educate the jury by explaining the basis for his opinion. If, for example,
the expert only testifies that a party was "negligent" or "unreasonable," then the
testimony does not help the jury. The expert must explain the facts and what
those facts mean in light of the legal standard that the judge will ask the jury
to apply. To do otherwise serves only to echo one party, as "the oath-helpers of
an earlier day," and such testimony is a waste of time. 178
Expert testimony should be admissible after these foundational
requirements have been met. It is simply not feasible to "usurp the authority of
the judge" when the judge has determined that the expert is qualified, that the
expert understands and accepts the legal standards, and that the testimony
may be helpful to the jury.
C. Credibility: The Jury Instruction
Just as it is impossible to "usurp the authority of the judge" if the proper
foundation is laid, it is equally impossible to "usurp the role of the jury" so long
as the judge gives the proper jury instructions. In 1942, in United States v.
Johnson,179 the Supreme Court ruled on the admission of expert testimony that
was argued to have "invade[d] the province of the jury."18 0 With razor-sharp
insight, the Court noted:
The worth of our jury system is constantly and properly extolled, but
an argument such as that which we are rejecting tacitly assumes that
juries are too stupid to see the drift of evidence. The jury in this case
could not possibly have been misled.... So long as proper guidance
by a trial court leaves the jury free to exercise its untrammeled
judgment upon the worth and weight of testimony, and nothing is
done to impair its freedom to bring its verdict and not someone else's
we ought not be too finicky or fearful in allowing some discretion [in
the admission of testimony] to trial judges ....
1771d.
178
Federal Rule of Evidence 705 allows an expert to state an opinion without
providing the basis for his opinion. This article does not attempt to explore the problems
inherent in such a rule. It is worthwhile, however, to note that rendering an opinion
without its basis cannot possibly help the jury to exercise its own combined judgment
in reaching a verdict. Not having been told the basis of the opinion, but being forced to
decide if it is valid, the jury is required to speculate in an area beyond its competence
either to accept the opinion or to disregard it. The expert, in effect, has "merely... [told]
the jury what result to reach," and, as such, has attempted to usurp the role of the jury.
See FED. R. Evrl. 704, advisory committee's note, supra note 7.
179319 U.S. 503 (1942).
180

1d. at 519.

181id.
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If the jury is presented with expert testimony from both sides, both sides have
an equal opportunity for cross-examination, and if thejudge plainly and clearly
explains to the jury that it is free to attach the level of credibility that it sees fit
to any and all witnesses, including the experts, then the jury can render a
collective opinion based upon its determination of the evidence presented.
D. A ProposedRule 704
Because of the somewhat obscure tenor of Rule 704,182 and because the
federal courts have encountered difficulty in applying its spirit, a revised Rule
704 should be promulgated which more clearly defines the parameters of the
admissibility of expert opinion testimony on mixed questions of law and fact.
Such a rule would set forth a precise set of criteria, thereby ensuring increased
predictability among courts. A revision would promote judicial economy,
enabling litigants to operate with some degree of certainty. Such a rule might
be:
Rule 704: Expert Opinions
Expert testimony in the form of an opinion or inference is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact, so long as:
(a)
(b)
(c)

(d)

such testimony may assist the trier of fact in understanding
any fact in issue or the law as it applies to any fact in issue;
the expert has been properly qualified to render such an
opinion on the subject which is before the court;
the expert's understanding and acceptance of the legal
standards which may affect his opinion have been
determined to be entirely congruent with that of the court;
and
if there is a jury, it has been properly instructed that it may
accept or disregard all or any portions of the expert's
testimony.
V. CONCLUSION

The judicial system is drastically overburdened, and today there are
countless delays in litigation at both the trial and appellate court levels. Courts
must recognize this and move toward a goal which would give parties the
opportunity to litigate their differences fully and fairly, encouraging just
results, while at the same time discouraging unnecessary appeals.
Judges can and should move toward effectuating this goal in the context of
expert opinion testimony by applying a straightforward, uniform analysis to
determine whether or not the proffered testimony is admissible. The expert
should then be allowed to state the substance of his opinion unimpaired by
182

See FED. R. EvID. 704(a), supra note 7; FED. R. EVID. 704(b), supra text accompanying

note 115.
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needless quibbling over its form. Specifically, to render expert opinion
testimony admissible, the judge should: first establish that the expert is
qualified to render an opinion; second, that the expert understands and accepts
the law as the judge will apply it in the case; and third, and most importantly,
that the testimony may be helpful to the jury. Once these foundational
requirements have been met, such testimony cannot "usurp the role of the
judge," and thus should not be inadmissible based on some artificial label, such
as, "impermissible legal conclusion":
Labeling evidence as a legal conclusion and holding it excludable on
that ground obscures the real reason for its inadmissibility-lack of
helpfulness--and frustrates a proper inquiry into that issue. When an
expert gives an opinion that applies the principles of his expertise to
the facts in evidence, thereby testifying to his view of the ultimate
issue, his opinion will often be in the form of a "legal conclusion," i.e.,
a conclusion as to the legal result in the case. When jurors understand
the legal criteria upon which the opinion is founded, such a "legal
conclusion" may nonetheless be helpful to them. Thus, a standard that
focuses on a label rather than on the value of the evidence to the jury
may well exclude helpful evidence that is properly admissible, a result
contrary to Rules 702 and 704.183
Allowing each party's expert to render an opinion which not only states the
expert's conclusion but which educates the jury on the basis for the opinion,
gives each party the opportunity to present fully the substance of its case
without fear that meaningful evidence will be excluded because its form is
deemed improper. This is the sort of testimony which truly aids the jury in
rendering its verdict: testimony which brings together dry and obscure legal
principles and technically foreign facts and fuses them into simple and solid
opinions.
So long as each side is allowed to present the substance of its case, and so
long as the jury is plainly instructed that it is the ultimate trier of fact and that
it may decide what weight, if any, to place on all testimony, such testimony
cannot harm either party, nor does it "usurp the role of the jury," but instead
enhances it.
Factual disputes are complicated, and parties hire experts to help explain
their theory to the jury. By the time litigants reach trial, they have each made a
significant investment in their experts. It is time for courts to acknowledge that
expert opinion testimony which applies the law to the facts is helpful to the
jury if it is properly dealt with by the judge. It is time to let the experts testify.

183 Specht, 853 F.2d at 814 (arguing that expert opinion testimony which applies the
law to the facts should not be per se inadmissible).
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